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INTRODUCTION
Human beings are naturally inquisitive and instinctively seek to
complete that which is incomplete. When a word is removed from
a sentence and replaced with a blank space, human nature seeks to
complete the sentence and determine what belongs in the blank
space. The difficulties of attempting to cover up parts of sentences
in the hope that people will ignore their human nature and
disregard what was removed are clear to anyone familiar with the
Watergate scandal. During the presidency of Richard Nixon,
conversations held in the Oval Office and over the phone among
government officials, including President Nixon himself, were
secretly recorded.' When the story about the break-in at the
Watergate hotel was uncovered, the tapes became evidence linking
the President and others to the orchestrated burglary and subse-
quent cover-up.2 Some of the tapes were turned over to prosecutors
and transcribed for use during the investigation.' Parts of the
transcripts were altered, however. In place of the foul language that
the President and others frequently used, the editors of the
transcripts substituted the phrases "expletive removed" or "exple-
tive deleted."4 Yet, for anyone reading the transcripts, not only was
it obvious that something had been removed, it did not take a great
1. Lawrence Meyer, President Taped Talks, Phone Calls: Principal Offices Secretly
Bugged Since Spring 1971, WASH. POST, July 17, 1973, at Al.
2. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
3. Many of the transcripts of the conversations are available to the public. Transcripts
of President Nixon's conversations are available through the Nixon Archives' website:
http://nixon.archives.gov/ find/tapes/finding-aids.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2006).
4. See, e.g., Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting Between the President and Henry
Petersen in the Oval Office on April 19, 1973, from 10:12 to 11:07 a.m., at 5, available at
http://nixon.archives.gov/find/tapeswatergate/wspf/902-002_902-003.pdf (submitted for in
camera review in the Watergate litigation) ("This -but frankly, I really didn't know this
myself until this case came out. I said, 'What in the (expletive removed) is Hunt doing?"'); see
also Hugh Rawson, The Words of Watergate: An Anniversary Look Back at the Biggest
Presidential Scandal Ever, Through the Changes It Wrought in the Language, AM. HERITAGE,
Oct. 1997, available at http://www.americanheritage.com/articleslmagazine/ah/1997/6/
1997_6_24.shtml (discussing the words and phrases that came to be associated with the
Watergate scandal, including a discussion of the phrase "expletive deleted").
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deal of effort to determine which words "expletive deleted" may
have replaced.5
The problems with removing offensive references and finding
suitable replacements are not unique to the Watergate recordings.
As multiple-defendant criminal trials become more common,
especially in drug conspiracy, terrorism, and RICO prosecutions,
prosecutors and judges face similar difficulties trying to ensure that
defendants receive fair trials.' Such problems arise where one
defendant in a joint trial confesses to his crime, and in the confes-
sion, he implicates his codefendant in some way. Although such a
statement is admissible against the confessor, provided it was
lawfully obtained and voluntary, it is inadmissible hearsay with
regard to his codefendant if the confessor does not testify.7 If the
confession is introduced at their joint trial, the jury will hear the
statements that implicate the nonconfessing defendant as well as
the confessing defendant. If the confessing defendant does not
testify, the nonconfessing defendant has no opportunity to cross-
examine the confessor on his statement, thus denying him the right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' When the jury
thus hears evidence that is inadmissible against the codefendant,
there is a danger that the jurors will improperly consider this
5. Indeed, one website even offers a prize for the most creative guesses as to which
words or phrases were removed from the transcripts. See The Watergate [EXPLETIVE
DELETED] Contest, http://www.superseventies. com/expledel.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2006).
6. Conspiracy trials have become more common due to the significant advantages
offered to prosecutors under the law, including exceptions to the general prohibition on
hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). In many circumstances, coconspirators are tried
jointly. Joint trials are relatively common in the prosecution of white-collar crime, as well,
and these prosecutions present similar difficulties. See Paul Marcus, Re-evaluating Large
Multiple-Defendant Criminal Prosecutions, 11 WM. &MARYBILLRTS. J.67 (2002) (discussing
prosecutions of group criminal activity, such as those under RICO, and the difficulties that
arise when jointly prosecuting white-collar criminals).
7. Such a statement would be an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the
matter asserted. It would therefore be generally inadmissible as evidence. See FED. R. EVID.
801, 802. It would, however, be admissible against the nonconfessing defendant if the
confessing codefendant was a coconspirator and made the statement in furtherance of the
conspiracy. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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inadmissible evidence when determining the nonconfessing defen-
dant's guilt. This danger is called the "Bruton problem."9
There are various ways to avoid the danger that the jury will
consider inadmissible evidence like the confession when determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of the nonconfessing defendant. The most
obvious is to sever the trials and try each defendant separately. 10
The problem can also be avoided altogether by simply choosing not
to use the confession. Courts have rejected this "sever or never"
approach, however, and have chosen to permit the introduction of
confessions in joint trials provided the references to nonconfessing
defendants are redacted." As a guard against the dangers that a
jury will improperly consider the confession as evidence against the
nonconfessing defendants, judges issue limiting instructions, which
juries are presumed to follow.' 2
The Supreme Court has held that a limiting instruction alone is
not constitutionally sufficient to protect the rights of the
nonconfessing defendant in a Bruton situation." The Court held
that if the references to the codefendant are fully redacted,
however, the introduction of the confession along with a limiting
instruction is not a violation of the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause.' 4 On the question of just how much redaction
9. This label comes from Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the landmark
case concerning the use of confessions in multiple-defendant prosecutions.
10. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 93 ("The obvious answer, of course, is to sever on this
basis. After all, if the parties are tried separately, the Bruton problem instantly disappears,
as only the defendant's own statement will be heard by her jury."). One trial in which a court
ordered severance based on a Bruton problem was the trial of Timothy McVeigh for the
Oklahoma City bombing. Both McVeigh and his partner, Terry Nichols, made statements to
the FBI that incriminated the other, and they were tried separately after the judge upheld
their Bruton objection. See Christopher B. Mueller, Tales Out of School-Spillover
Confessions and Against-Interest Statements Naming Others, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 929, 956
(2001).
11. See discussion of Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), infra Part III.A, which
found complete redaction of all references to the defendant to be acceptable protection, and
Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), infra Part III.C, which prohibited the use of symbol
redaction.
12. See, e.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) ("Our theory of trial relies
upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions.").
13. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text; see also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
388-89 (1964) (rejecting the presumption that a limiting instruction was sufficient to prevent
a jury from considering the improper confession of the defendant as evidence against him).
14. See infra Part III.A.
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is required or what method of redaction is permissible, however, the
Court has been less than clear.' 5 These questions have tormented
state and federal courts for years, and the Supreme Court has
offered little guidance on the issue.
One method of redaction that some courts have employed in an
attempt to comply with the Court's jurisprudence in this area is
neutral pronoun redaction. 6 This method of redaction involves
substituting neutral pronouns or phrases for the nonconfessing
defendant's name. For example, a confession that stated, "Jane,
Bob, and I robbed the bank" might be redacted to read, 'The others
and I robbed the bank." The Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the issue of neutral pronoun redaction, though the Court
has found similar redaction methods to be unconstitutional. 7 This
Note will examine the issue of neutral pronoun redaction and argue
that it is an acceptable form of compliance with the Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. In Part I, this Note will discuss the
Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence prior to Bruton v.
United States. Part II will examine the Bruton holding and lower
courts' attempts to comply with it. Part III will discuss the Court's
attempt to limit Bruton in Richardson and its expansion of the
Bruton principle in Gray. This Part will also discuss the confusion
these decisions caused among the lower courts. Part IV of this Note
will examine the question of neutral pronoun redaction, arguing
that it is different from symbol redaction and less likely to prejudice
a nonconfessing defendant. A limiting instruction, therefore, would
be sufficient to protect a defendant's rights if his codefendant's
confession were redacted using the neutral pronoun method.
Finally, in an attempt to create uniformity and achieve the finality
the Supreme Court has yet to achieve in this area, this Note will
suggest a two-pronged test for determining the admissibility of
redacted confessions. Under this test, the admissibility of a
redacted confession depends on both the likelihood that jurors will
15. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 94 (describing redaction as "[n]ot exactly ... [a] simple
and neat solution").
16. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 2003)
(permitting the substitution of the word "someone" for the nonconfessing defendant's name).
17. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (holding that use of the word
"deleted" and blank spaces in a confession to replace the names of the other defendants
violated a nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
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speculate as to the identity of the redaction and the strength of the
inferential connection between the redaction and the identity of the
defendant.
I. DELLI PAOLI AND THE QUESTION OF CONFESSIONS
PRIOR TO BRUTON
A. Delli Paoli
The Court first dealt with the issue of codefendant confessions in
Delli Paoli v. United States.8 Orlando Delli Paoli and four other
codefendants were convicted in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York for conspiring to illegally
transport alcohol and evade taxes. 9 At the end of the Government's
case, the court admitted into evidence the written confession of one
coconspirator, Whitley, which he had given in the presence of
federal agents and his attorney.20 The trial court admitted the
confession "with an emphatic warning that it was to be considered
solely in determining the guilt of Whitley and not in determining
the guilt of any other defendant."'" Delli Paoli was found guilty, and
he appealed his conviction. The Second Circuit, in an opinion
written by Judge Learned Hand, affirmed Delli Paoli's conviction.
22
In an opinion written by Justice Burton, the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that the admission of the
confession into evidence was not error based on the evidentiary
18. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
19. See id. at 233.
20. Id. at 233-34. The Government initially offered the confession as evidence during its
case-in-chief, but the court postponed a ruling on the admissibility of the confession until the
close of the Government's case. See id.
21. Id. at 234. The trial court's admonition to use the confession only for this narrow
purpose was based on a hearsay theory, rather than on constitutional grounds. As the court
explained to the jury, the difference between considering a confession as evidence against the
confessor and against another defendant is that, as against the confessor, it is "an admission
against interest which a person ordinarily would not make," whereas against the
codefendant, the statement "is nothing more than hearsay evidence." Id. at 240. The trial
judge repeated the warnings to the jury several times during cross-examination and gave the
jury a lengthy final warning during the jury charge. See id.
22. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956).
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rules concerning statements made during a conspiracy. s3 The Court
noted that statements made by one conspirator in furtherance of
the conspiracy are admissible into evidence against any and all
other coconspirators, but any declarations made after the termina-
tion of the conspiracy "may be used only against the declarant and
under appropriate instructions to the jury."24 The Court recognized
that requiring the jury to consider evidence as against only one
person and not with regard to others placed a "heavy burden" on the
jurors,25 but it found that the burden was not so heavy as to make
the task impossible.2"
The Court, noting that the trial court had given multiple limiting
instructions before giving the case to the jury,27 defined the issue in
Delli Paoli as "whether, under all the circumstances, the court's
instructions to the jury provided petitioner with sufficient protec-
tion [with regard to] the admission of Whitley's confession."28 The
resolution of that issue, according to the Court, depended "on
whether the instructions were sufficiently clear and whether it was
reasonably possible for the jury to follow them."2" Relying on the
"long-standing" presumption that a clear limiting instruction could
prevent other defendants from being prejudiced by the introduction
of a postconspiracy declaration,30 the Court determined that the
trial court's limiting instructions were sufficiently clear.3'
23. Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 237. Before reaching the question of the confession's
admissibility, the Court initially noted that, whether the confession was admissible, the other
evidence against Delli Paoli was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Id. at 236-37.
24. Id. at 237.
25. See id. at 238.
26. See id. ("While these difficulties have been pointed out in several cases the rule has
nonetheless been applied.") (citations omitted). Interestingly, and somewhat presciently, the
Court noted that if all references to the nondeclarants were removed from the confession,
there would be no plausible objection to the confession's admissibility. Id. at 237.
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
28. Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 239. The Court specifically distinguished Delli Paoli from
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), on which Delli Paoli relied in claiming that
the confession was inadmissible. Krulewitch held that the confession of a conspirator made
after the conclusion of the conspiracy was not admissible at the trial of a coconspirator, but,
as the Delli Paoli Court noted, the declarant in Krulewitch was not on trial. See Delli Paoli,
352 U.S. at 239.
29. Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 239.
30. See id. at 239 n.5.
31. See id. at 240-41.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:345
Having resolved the question of the sufficiency of the instruc-
tions, the Court then considered whether the jury followed those
instructions. The Court explained that, in light of the presumption
that juries follow the instructions they are given,32 and the facts of
the case,3 3 it was reasonable to presume the jury followed the
instructions given by the trial judge.34 Although the Court did
recognize that there may be "practical limitations" to the general
presumption that a jury follows its instructions, the particular facts
suggested that those limitations were not present in this case,35 and
the Court therefore affirmed Delli Paoli's conviction.36
Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion37 in which he
questioned the sufficiency of limiting instructions: 'The fact of the
matter is that too often such an admonition against misuse is
intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible
declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors."3" As
Justice Frankfurter pointed out, it is not reasonable to expect jurors
to understand and follow the limiting instructions given by the
judge, as "[t]he admonition [frequently] becomes a futile collocation
of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to
32. See id. at 242 ("It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the law
to the jury and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the jury finds them .... 'Our
theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions." (quoting Opper v.
United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954)). This presumption was necessary, according to the
Court, in order to maintain the efficacy of the jury system. Id.
33. See id. at 241-42 (discussing the factors the Court considered, including the simplicity
of the conspiracy, the emphasis on the separate interests of the defendants throughout the
trial, the introduction of the confession at the end of the prosecution's case, the fact that the
confession merely corroborated the other evidence against Delli Paoli, and the lack of
evidence in the record to suggest the jury's confusion).
34. See id. at 241.
35. See id. at 243.
36. Id. The Court suggested that substantial deference should be paid to the trial judge's
decision whether to try the codefendants separately or to try them jointly and admit the
confession. See id. The Court held that the decision as to whether a jury instruction was
insufficient should be a case-by-case determination based "on the circumstances of the
particular case." Id.
37. This dissenting opinion would play a central role in the Court's subsequent decision
to limit the policy of relying on jury instructions in this context. See Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) ("Significantly, we supported that conclusion [in Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964)-that a limiting instruction was not sufficient to protect defendant's
rights] in part by reliance upon the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the four
Justices who dissented in Delli Paoli.").
38. Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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defendants." 9 Frankfurter and his fellow dissenters advocated a
"serious harm" standard, noting that "where a conspirator's
statement is so damning to another against whom it is inadmissi-
ble, ... the difficulty of introducing it against the declarant without
inevitable harm to a coconspirator ... is no justification for causing
such harm." °
In addition to their concerns about the logic underlying the
presumption that jurors follow instructions, the dissent also
expressed concern about the spillover effects of introducing such a
confession.4' The dissenters suggested that the prosecutor who finds
himself in such a situation should try the defendants separately,
42
and they rejected the majority's argument that admitting the
confession was harmless error simply because of the strength of the
other evidence against the defendant.43 As the dissent argued, no
matter how much evidence there may have been against the
defendant, it was still reversible error to introduce such "powerfully
improper evidence" as the confession.44
B. The Road to Bruton: Pointer, Douglas, and Jackson
What was striking about the Delli Paoli opinion was that it was
decided without reference to the defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights. Some scholars attribute the Court's failure to address the
issue, at least in part, to the fact that the Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence was not yet very extensive.45 Whatever the
39. Id.
40. Id. at 247-48. The dissent pointed out that there could be a circumstance in which the
confession "only glancingly ... affects a co-defendant"; in such a case, it might be appropriate
to leave the decision whether to admit the confession to the discretion of the trial judge. See
id. at 247.
41. See id. at 248 ("The Government should not have the windfall of having the jury be
influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not




45. See, e.g., Judith L. Ritter, The XFiles: Joint Trials, Redacted Confessions, and Thirty
Years of Sidestepping Bruton, 42 VILL. L. REV. 855, 864 n.59 (1997) ("It is difficult to account
for the lack of Confrontation Clause analysis in Delli Paoli. One possibility is that in 1957
... the Supreme Court had not formally pronounced that the Sixth Amendment right of an
accused to confront witnesses against him included the right to cross-examine those
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
reason, neither the majority nor the dissent saw Delli Paoli as a
constitutional case,4 and they instead focused on the question of
whether juries could be relied upon to heed limiting instructions. As
the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence expanded in the
years following Delli Paoli, the presumption supporting the decision
in Delli Paoli-that juries followed instructions-was undermined.
Three decisions, all of which would figure prominently in Bruton,
were responsible for bringing to the fore consideration of the role of
the Confrontation Clause in joint criminal trials.47
1. Pointer v. Texas
In Pointer v. Texas,4" the Court considered whether the right to
confront one's accusers, protected by the Sixth Amendment,
included the right to cross-examine witnesses, and whether that
right applied in state courts.49 Pointer was charged with robbery
and tried in a Texas state court.50 The only witness against him, the
victim of the robbery, was unavailable for trial.51 In place of the
victim's testimony, the prosecutor introduced, over Pointer's
objections,52 the testimony given by the witness at the pretrial
hearing."
The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses necessarily included the right to cross-examine
witnesses.').
46. David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good
News and Some Bad News, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 54 (1988).
47. See Ritter, supra note 45, at 862-68, for a discussion of the cases leading up to
Bruton.
48. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
49. See id. at 401.
50. See id. at 401-02 (describing Pointer's trial, conviction, and appeal).
51. See id. at 401.
52. See id. at 401-02 (recounting Pointer's objections). Pointer objected both before and
during trial, arguing that the failure of the victim to testify denied him his right to confront
the witnesses against him. See id. The judge allowed the reading of the testimony based on
the fact that Pointer had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary
hearing, when the testimony was given. See id. Pointer contested this ruling, arguing that,
because he had not been given an attorney at the preliminary hearing, he was unable to
cross-examine the victim at that time. See id. at 403.
53. See id. at 401.
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them.5 4 Cross-examination, in the Court's opinion, was an essential
and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial guaranteed
by the Constitution.' The right to cross-examine witnesses was also
a fundamental right,56 according to the Court, which applied even
in state courts.5 v
2. Douglas v. Alabama
The Court decided Douglas v. Alabama" on the same day as
Pointer. Douglas was charged with assault with attempt to murder
and tried in an Alabama state court.59 At the trial, the prosecutor
called as a witness Douglas's accomplice, Loyd, who had previously
been tried and found guilty." Because Loyd intended to appeal his
conviction, his attorney advised him to remain silent and refuse to
answer the prosecutor's questions.6" In light of this difficulty, the
judge permitted the prosecutor to treat Loyd as a hostile witness,
and the prosecutor, purportedly "to refresh Loyd's recollection, ...
read from [Loyd's confession], pausing after every few sentences to
ask Loyd ... 'Did you make that statement?' Each time, Loyd ...
refused to answer, but the [prosecutor] continued this form of
54. See id. at 404 ("It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-
examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the
witnesses against him.").
55. See id. at 405. According to the Court, "probably no one, certainly no one experienced
in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and
bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case." Id. at 404.
56. See id. at 404 ("The fact that this right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill
of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards that
confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.").
The Court also held that the right to confront witnesses was a guarantee protected by the
Due Process Clause: "Indeed, we have expressly declared that to deprive an accused of the
right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process of law." Id. at 405.
57. See id. at 406. The Court had previously ruled that the Sixth Amendment was
applicable in state courts. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
58. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
59. See id. at 416.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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questioning until the entire document had been read."2 Loyd's
confession implicated Douglas in the crime. 3
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court, held that
the admission of Loyd's confession, in light of his refusal to testify,
denied Douglas his right to cross-examine his accuser.' According
to the Court, the confession was the only direct evidence of
Douglas's involvement in the crime, and the introduction of the
confession added significant credibility to the government's case. 65
The Court expressed concern that the manner in which the
confession was introduced-through the prosecutor's leading
questions66-- combined with the refusal of Loyd to testify led jurors
to believe that Loyd had indeed made the statements implicating
Douglas and that those statements were true.67 According to the
Court, the admission of Loyd's confession therefore violated
Douglas's right to confront his accusers."
3. Jackson v. Denno
A third case that laid the foundation for the Court's rejection of
Delli Paoli was Jackson v. Denno.69 In Jackson, the defendant was
arrested at the scene of a shooting. Jackson had been injured during
the course of a firefight, and he was taken to a hospital, where he
was given an injection of Demerol.7 ° Immediately after the injection,
Jackson was subjected to an interrogation by the Assistant District
62. Id. at 416-17.
63. See id. at 417 ("The statements from the document as read by the Solicitor recited in
considerable detail the circumstances leading to and surrounding the alleged crime; of crucial
importance, they named the petitioner as the person who fired the shotgun blast which
wounded the victim.").
64. See id. at 419.
65. See id.
66. The Court explained: "Although the [prosecutor's] reading of Loyd's alleged
statement, and Loyd's refusals to answer, were not technically testimony, the [prosecutor's]
reading may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that Loyd in fact
made the statement .... " Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
70. Id. at 371.
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Attorney, during which Jackson confessed to the crime. 7' At trial
Jackson questioned the voluntariness of his confession, and the jury
was instructed to disregard the confession if it found that it was
involuntarily given. 2 Jackson was ultimately found guilty, and he
appealed his conviction on the grounds that the confession was
improperly admitted as evidence.73
In overturning Jackson's conviction, the Court rejected the
presumption that jurors could ignore the confession if they indeed
found it involuntary. 74 Given the concern that a jury, having heard
the confession, would be influenced by it regardless of its admissi-
bility, the Court held that this case presented one circumstance in
which it could not presume that jurors could follow instructions to
ignore such evidence when determining guilt or innocence.75 The
rejection of this long-held presumption would prove to be an
important precedent for the Court's decision in Bruton.
II. BRUTON AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONFRONTED
A. Bruton v. United States
In 1968, Bruton v. United States76 presented the Court with the
chance to reexamine its Delli Paoli holding7 7 in light of the recent
developments in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Bruton and
his codefendant, Evans, were charged with armed postal robbery.78
Prior to the trial, Evans orally confessed to the postal inspector in
charge of the investigation that both he and Bruton committed the
71. The Court noted that by this time, almost three hours after the shoot-out with the
police, Jackson, who had been shot in the liver and lung, had lost almost 500 cc of blood. See
id.
72. See id. at 375 n.5 for a copy of the jury instruction.
73. See id. at 375-76.
74. See id. at 381, 389 (discussing the lower courts' presumption that the jury could
follow the instructions given to it).
75. See id. at 388-89. Professor Ritter finds it significant that the Court quoted Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Delli Paoli when discussing the issue of whether it could
presume that juries would follow limiting instructions. See Ritter, supra note 45, at 868 n.90.
76. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
77. See id. at 125.
78. Id. at 124.
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robbery.79 Both Bruton and Evans were convicted following a joint
trial, and each appealed his conviction to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals.' Evans's conviction was overturned by the Circuit
Court, which held that his conviction was improperly obtained
under the rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona"' and thus could not
be admitted as evidence against him.82 Despite the constitutional
problems with Evans's conviction, however, the Circuit Court held
that the admission of Evans's confession was not error with regard
to Bruton, as the trial court had given the jury a limiting instruc-
tion in order to prevent it from being prejudiced by the statements
in the confession that implicated Bruton. 3 Bruton appealed the
Circuit Court's decision to the Supreme Court.
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court
overturned Bruton's conviction and held that the admission of
Evans's confession violated Bruton's right to confront his accuser,84
as there was a "substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements
in determining [Bruton's] guilt." 5 In deciding to overturn Bruton's
conviction based on the improper admission of Evans's confession,
the Court explicitly overruled its earlier decision in Delli Paoli."o
The Court's decision to overrule Delli Paoli was based largely on
its earlier decisions in Pointer, Douglas, and Jackson.7 According
to the Court, "[t]he basic premise of Delli Paoli was that it is
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
82. See Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir. 1966).
83. See id. at 362.
84. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126. The discussion of the Confrontation Clause in the
context of codefendant confessions was novel, as this constitutional provision was not the
basis for the Court's decision in Delli Paoli. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
85. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.
86. See id. at 125-26. It is interesting to note that the Solicitor General submitted a
memo to the Court in which he urged that Bruton's conviction be reversed and remanded for
a new trial in light of the fact that Evans's confession was deemed inadmissible and his
conviction reversed, as upholding the conviction of Bruton under such circumstances "may
... place too great a strain upon the [Delli Paoli] rule-at least, where, as here the other
evidence against [Bruton] is not strong." See id. at 125-26 (first alteration in original). This
statement by the Solicitor General suggests that the Court could have overturned the
conviction without overturning Delli Paoli, or even referring to it at all.
87. See id. at 126 ("But since Delli Paoli was decided this Court has effectively repudiated
its basic premise.").
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'reasonably possible for the jury to follow' sufficiently clear instruc-
tions to disregard the confessor's extrajudicial statement that his
codefendant participated with him in committing the crime."8 In
Jackson, however, the Court had specifically rejected the presump-
tion that a limiting instruction was sufficient to protect a
codefendant's rights. 9 The Court held that it was more difficult for
the jury to ignore a confession when introduced against a
codefendant in a joint trial like Bruton's than when the statement
is introduced against only the defendant himself.9" As the Court
suggested, in a joint trial where the confessor's admissible confes-
sion implicates his codefendant, "the jury is expected to perform the
overwhelming task of considering it in determining the guilt or
innocence of the declarant and then ignoring it in determining the
guilt or innocence of any codefendants of the declarant."91 According
to the Court, if it is an "overwhelming task" to ignore an admissible
confession, then where the confession is inadmissible against the
confessor, as Evans's had been in Bruton, it is a near impossible
task to ignore that confession as evidence against the codefendant.92
In repudiating the presumption that juries can ignore a
codefendant's confession when considering the guilt or innocence of
the non-confessing defendant, the Court rejected various arguments
that a limiting instruction was sufficient in such a situation. The
Court rejected the premise that jury instructions provide a way
around the exclusionary rules of evidence in such a way as to
promote rather than hinder the search for the truth,93 noting that
88. Id. (citing Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)).
89. See id. at 129. See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of Jackson.
90. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 130. In analogizing Jackson to Bruton and Delli Paoli, the
Court referred to the decision written by California Supreme Court Chief Justice Traynor
in People v. Aranda, in which he held that "[Jackson's] logic extends to obviating the risks
that the jury may rely on any inadmissible statements" and that if it was a denial of due
process for a jury to rely on an improperly obtained confession, it was likewise a denial of due
process to rely on the jury's ability to ignore a confession that implicates a codefendant. See
People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72 (Cal. 1965) (emphasis added).
91. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131 (quoting Aranda, 407 P.2d at 271-72).
92. See id. at 133 n.9 ("When, however, the confession implicating both defendants is not
admissible at all, there is no longer room for compromise. The risk of prejudicing the
nonconfessing can no longer be justified by the need for introducing the confession against
the one who made it." (quoting Aranda, 407 P.2d at 270)).
93. See id. at 132-33 ("In Judge Hand's view the limiting instruction, although not really
capable of preventing the jury from considering the prejudicial evidence, does as a matter of
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:345
there are other ways to utilize the confession without infringing the
codefendant's rights.94 The majority likewise rejected the dissent's
argument that the efficiency of joint trials justified admitting these
confessions in such trials. The Court conceded that joint trials "do
conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and
public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of a
crime to trial,"95 but held that these benefits paled in comparison
to the costs of denying defendants their constitutional rights.96
The Court also rejected the argument that the efficacy and survival
of the jury system depended on the presumption that a jury
instruction was sufficient to prevent the jury from considering
inadmissible evidence.9" The Court held that while there were many
circumstances in which a jury could be depended on to ignore
inadmissible evidence, in certain contexts, such as that in Bruton,
in Which the extrajudicial statements are so "powerfully incriminat-
ing,"98 there is a greater risk that the jury will be unable to follow
the instructions.99
form provide a way around the exclusionary rules of evidence that is defensible because it
'probably furthers, rather than impedes, the search for truth. (quoting Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932))). Judge Hand was a harsh critic of the presumption
that juries can ignore inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d
319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) ("[lIt is indeed very hard to believe that a jury will, or for that matter
can, in practice observe the admonition."); United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d
Cir. 1948) ("Nobody can indeed fail to doubt whether the caution is effective ...."); Nash, 54
F.2d at 1007 (finding that the limiting instruction is a "recommendation to the jury of a
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else"). The Court
cited these and other opinions in a footnote in Bruton. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132 n.8.
94. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 ("Where viable alternatives do exist, it is deceptive to rely on
the pursuit of truth to defend a clearly harmful practice."). The Court discussed some of the
alternatives employed by lower courts, such as deletion of the references to codefendants. See
id. at 134 n.10.
95. Id. at 134.
96. See id. at 135 ("We secure greater speed, economy and convenience in the
administration of the law at the price of fundamental constitutional liberty. That price is too
high." (quoting People v. Fisher, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928)).
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See id. ("Inhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is ... great .... "). The Court also pointed out that the credibility of an
extrajudicial statement of an accomplice is inherently suspect given the propensity of an
accomplice to try to shift the blame to other accomplices, and that such a statement is even
less reliable when the defendant does not testify and the jury is not given the opportunity
to evaluate the credibility of the witness. See id. at 136. The Court also referred to the 1966
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was prompted by concerns
360
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Having established that a limiting instruction was not sufficient
to protect the right of a defendant to confront witnesses against
him, the Court found that Bruton had a constitutional right to
confront Evans and that the admission of Evans's confession
violated that right. °10 The Court determined that the introduction
of the confession "added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight
to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examina-
tion," ' thus denying Bruton his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation. °2 The Court further held that the violation of
Bruton's rights was even more egregious than the violation in
Douglas, °3 because in Bruton Evans's statements were actually
introduced into evidence, which, absent the opportunity to hear
Evans cross-examined, created a significant risk the jury would
believe all the statements were true and reliable-including those
implicating Bruton."°4 Because the potential failure of the jury to
ignore these "powerfully incriminating" statements "posed a
substantial threat"' 5 to Bruton's constitutional rights, "the prac-
tical and human limitations of the jury system [could not] be
ignored,"0 6 according to the Court."7
about the prejudice suffered by defendants when the confession of a codefendant is
introduced. See id. at 131 & n.6. According to the Advisory Committee on Rules, the
prejudice suffered by the nondeclarant "cannot be dispelled by cross-examination if the co-
defendant does not take the stand. Limiting instructions to the jury may not in fact erase the
prejudice." Id. at 132.
100. See id. at 126 ("[A] major reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is
to give a defendant charged with a crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him." (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965)).
101. Id. at 128.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 126-28 (analogizing Douglas and Bruton). See supra notes 58-68 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Douglas.
104. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 127.
105. Id. at 137.
106. Id. at 135.
107. The Court noted that it could not determine whether the jury did in fact ignore the
confession but held that it did not matter, as the mere possibility the jury considered it posed
a substantial threat to Bruton's rights. See id. at 136-37. In finding a reversible error, the
Court refused to accept a limiting instruction as a "substitute for [Bruton's] constitutional
right of cross-examination." Id. at 137.
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Justice Stewart wrote a separate concurrence, 0 8 noting that he
agreed with the Court's decision to overrule Delli Paoli but
disagreed that Jackson alone compelled this decision." 9 Rather,
Justice Stewart would have reached the same conclusion, even
without Jackson, based on the Sixth Amendment:
A basic premise of the Confrontation Clause, it seems to me, is
that certain kinds of hearsay are at once so damaging, so
suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be
trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically
deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give."'
Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented. Justice
White's lengthy dissent agreed that the statement was inadmissible
against Bruton because it was hearsay but determined its admis-
sion to be harmless error based on his presumption that juries
follow instructions."' Justice White decried the Court's decision as
"excessively rigid"'12 and expressed concern that the decision would
require the exclusion of all confessions implicating codefendants,
regardless of any limiting instructions." 3 This criticism of the
Court's decision focused on both the legal reasoning employed by
the Court and the practical ramifications of the Court's holding.
Justice White criticized the Court's reliance on Jackson, distin-
guishing that case because it concerned a defendant's confession
being introduced as evidence against himself rather than against a
codefendant, as in Bruton."4 This was a critical distinction for
Justice White, who stated that when a trial court instructs a jury
108. See id. (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Black also wrote a concurring opinion, in
which he referred to his opinion in Delli Paoli. See id. (Black, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 137-38 (Stewart, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 138 (citations omitted).
111. See id. at 138-39 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White:
Responsible judgment would be impossible but for the ability of men to focus
their attention wholly on reliable and credible evidence, and jurymen are no
less capable of exercising this capacity than other men.... I have no doubt that
serious-minded and responsible men are able to shut their minds to unreliable
information when exercising their judgment ....
Id. at 142-43.
112. Id. at 139.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 139-40. See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of Jackson.
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to disregard a coerced confession, it does so not because the
confession is necessarily unreliable, but in order to protect the
constitutional rights of the defendant who was coerced into
confessing."' This goal may be difficult for juries to understand,
hence the rules excluding such evidence.116 In contrast, when a jury
is told that it is not to consider a defendant's confession as evidence
against another defendant, it is because such statements are
unreliable, a concept which, according to Justice White, is reason-
able to believe that a jury will understand." 7
In addition to questioning the legal basis of the Court's decision,
the dissent criticized the majority's holding for its practical
ramifications and its lack of explanation as to how to employ the
announced standard."' The dissenting Justices suggested that the
new approach to dealing with confessions would place an unneces-
sary burden on prosecutors and would seemingly defeat the
efficiency rationale behind the joinder rules."1 9 The dissent empha-
sized the concern that the majority had dismissed as unpersuasive:
"[J]oint trials are more economical and minimize the burden on
witnesses, prosecutors, and courts."'2 Justice White expressed
concern that adhering to the majority's holding and requiring
separate trials would result in inconsistent rulings with regard to
similar defendants, delays in bringing defendants before a court,
and "jockeying for position with regard to who should be the first to
be tried."''
In discussing the burdens the majority's holding would place on
prosecutors, Justice White provided a preview of the question that
the court would have to answer in Richardson: whether the use of
115. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 140 (White, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 141.
117. See id. at 141-42. The dissent characterized codefendant confessions as hearsay,
"subject to all the dangers of inaccuracy which characterize hearsay generally," and the
confessor as "no more than an eyewitness, the accuracy of whose testimony about the
defendant's conduct is open to more doubt than would be the defendant's own account of his
actions." Id. at 141. Justice White further explained that courts generally rely on juries to
disregard most types of hearsay, and it is therefore difficult to believe that a jury will have
difficulty ignoring hearsay that is of such questionable reliability as the statement of a
codefendant. See id. at 142.
118. See id. at 143.
119. See id. at 144.
120. Id. at 143.
121. See id.
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a confession would be permissible under the majority's holding if
all references to the codefendant were deleted.'22 Justice White
expressed concern that even if deletion was sufficient to avoid
any constitutional concerns, the Court had provided no guidance as
to the amount of deletion required123 or how to handle oral state-
ments. 2 4 Despite these concerns, however, effective deletion was,
according to Justice White, perhaps the only way to comport with
the Court's holding and thus avoid the difficult decisions prosecu-
tors would have to make in choosing between not using a confession
and trying the defendants separately.'25
B. Bruton Applied
The Bruton decision was both hailed as a victory for the rights of
criminal defendants and excoriated by those who thought the rule
too burdensome. Though it was certainly a significant decision, the
immediate legacy of Bruton had more to do with what it did not
say than what it did say. Specifically, it did not directly address the
issue of whether redaction was a permissible method of avoiding a
Bruton problem, and redaction "quickly became a very effective
way for prosecutors to skirt around Bruton and to admit non-
testifying codefendant confessions in spite of Bruton's 'powerfully
incriminating' rule." '26 In determining whether redaction was a
permissible method to prevent a confession from being "powerfully
122. See id. ("I would suppose that it will be necessary to exclude all extrajudicial
confessions unless all portions of them which implicate defendants other than the declarant
are effectively deleted.").
123. Justice White explained that:
Effective deletion will probably require not only omission of all direct and
indirect inculpations of codefendants but also any statement that could be
employed against those defendants once their identity is otherwise established.
Of course, the deletion must not be such that it will distort the statements to
the substantial prejudice of either the declarant or the government.
Id.
124. See id. at 144 ("Oral statements ... will present special problems, for there is a risk
that the witness in testifying will inadvertently exceed permissible limits.").
125. See id. at 143-44.
126. Bryant M. Richardson, Casting Light on the Gray Area: An Analysis of the Use of
Neutral Pronouns in Non-Testifying Codefendant Redacted Confessions Under Bruton,
Richardson, and Gray, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 826, 835-36 (2001).
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incriminating," two competing approaches emerged.'27 Some courts
advocated using what came to be known as "contextual implication"
analysis, 121 which required a trial court to examine the redacted
confession in light of all the evidence introduced at trial in order to
determine whether the confession implicated the codefendant.
129
Other courts interpreted the Bruton rule to require an examination
of only the face of the confession itself;13° thus, "as long as the face
or four corners of the confession do not incriminate a jointly tried
defendant, the court need look no further."'' This relatively even
split in the circuits persisted for almost twenty years until the
Court finally got the chance to settle the debate between "contex-
tual implication" and "facially incriminating" analysis in 1987.
III. REEXAMINING BRUTON: RICHARDSON AND GRAY
A. Limiting Bruton: Richardson v. Marsh
Richardson v. Marsh 32 gave the Court its chance to address the
issue of whether prosecutors could comply with the dictates of
Bruton by introducing a codefendant's confession in which all
references to the defendant have been redacted. At issue in
Richardson was the "contextual implication" or "evidentiary
linkage" approach to applying Bruton.113 The defendant, Clarissa
Marsh, was one of three defendants charged with assault and
127. See generally James B. Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration of the
Confrontation Rationale, and a Proposal for a Due Process Evaluation of Limiting
Instructions, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1980) (discussing courts' responses to Bruton and
suggesting a due process approach to analyzing the admissibility of codefendant confessions).
128. See Ritter, supra note 45, at 872-76 (defining contextual implication analysis and
discussing it by way of an illustrative hypothetical).
129. See, e.g., English v. United States, 620 F.2d 150, 152 (7th Cir. 1980) (requiring an
evaluation of the confession in the context of other evidence); Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643,
647 (6th Cir. 1978) (requiring that the evaluation of the inculpatory nature of a confession
include other evidence); Serio v. United States, 401 F.2d 989, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(interpreting Bruton as requiring contextual analysis).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 849 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that
a statement violates Bruton only if it is inculpatory on its face); United States v. Wright, 742
F.2d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting contextual analysis); United States v. Belle, 593
F.2d 487, 495 (3d Cir. 1979) (rejecting contextual linkage analysis).
131. Ritter, supra note 45, at 874-75.
132. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
133. See id. at 206.
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murder."' Marsh and one other defendant, Benjamin Williams,
were tried jointly in a Michigan state court. 135 At the trial, the
prosecutor introduced into evidence a statement that Williams, who
chose not to testify, had made to the police following his arrest.13 6
The statement described a conversation that took place between
Williams and a third defendant, Martin, in a car en route to the
victims' residence.3 7 During the conversation, Martin "said that he
would have to kill the victims after the robbery. 1 3 Williams's
confession, which "largely corroborated" the testimony of the victim
as to the events that took place in the house, 131 was edited prior to
its introduction into evidence such that "all reference to
[Marsh]-indeed, ... all indication that anyone other than Martin
and Williams participated in the crime," was omitted. 4 ° Upon the
introduction of the confession, the judge warned the jury not to use
the confession against Marsh.'
Marsh chose to testify in her defense and admitted that she was
present both in the victims' house during the murders and in the
car with Martin and Williams.'42 Marsh claimed that she did not
know that the two men were armed and that, because she was in
the back seat of the car, she did not hear the conversation that
Williams detailed in his confession.1 43
During his closing statement, the prosecutor reminded the jury
of the judge's instruction not to use the confession against Marsh, 144
but he also alerted the jury to the correlation between Marsh's
134. See id. at 202.
135. The third defendant, Kareem Martin, was still a fugitive by the time the case came
to trial. See id.
136. See id. at 203-04.
137. See id. at 204.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 203-04.
140. Id. For the full text of the redacted confession, see id. at 203 n.1.
141. See id. at 204.
142. See id. Marsh testified that she owed Martin money, and that she took him to the
victims' residence, where she had previously been employed, in order to ask for a loan.
Martin picked up Williams on the way to the house, during which time the conversation
regarding the plan to rob and kill the inhabitants took place. Once inside the house, Martin
pulled a gun, and he and Williams took the victims into the basement and shot them. See id.
Despite the fact that she opened the door to allow Williams to enter the house, Marsh
claimed that "she did not feel free to leave and was too scared to flee." Id.
143. See id.
144. See id at 205.
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testimony, in which she said she had been in the car during the
conversation between Martin and Williams but had heard nothing,
and Williams's description of the conversation.145 Before sending the
jury to deliberate, the judge again warned the jury not to use
Williams's confession against Marsh. 4 ' Marsh was convicted of
felony murder and assault, and her conviction was upheld by the
Michigan Court of Appeals.
14 7
Marsh filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, claiming
that the introduction of Williams's confession at the trial violated
her rights under the Sixth Amendment as defined in Bruton.'48 The
Sixth Circuit overturned Marsh's conviction, holding that when
applying Bruton, a court must "assess the confession's 'inculpatory
value' by examining not only the face of the confession, but also all
of the evidence introduced at trial."'49 As the Sixth Circuit pointed
out, the only direct evidence of Marsh's intent to commit the
robbery and murders was the link between her statements and the
confession of Williams;150 thus, the introduction of the confession
was "powerfully incriminating to Marsh with respect to the critical
element of intent."'5 ' The Sixth Circuit held that, given "[t]he
paucity of other evidence of intent and the prosecution's use of the
Williams confession against Marsh,"'152 there was a "substantial risk
that the jury would consider Williams' statement in their delibera-
tions regarding Marsh's guilt.'' 153 The Sixth Circuit found the
violation of Bruton to be reversible error and remanded the case for
reconsideration of the habeas petition.
154
145. See id. The prosecutor, after reminding the jury that Marsh had testified she was in
the back seat of the car, said: "Why did she say she couldn't hear any conversation? She said,
'I know they were having conversation but I couldn't hear it because of the radio.' Because
if she admits that she heard the conversation and she admits to the plan, she's guilty of at
least armed robbery." Id. at 205 n.2.
146. See id. at 205.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 205-06 (citing Marsh v. Richardson, 781 F.2d 1201, 1212 (6th Cir. 1986)).
150. See Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1212.
151. Id. at 1213.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 1214. The Sixth Circuit was especially concerned by the prosecutor's actions
during the trial: "Especially pertinent in this case is ... that the prosecution in closing
argument pointed out the impermissible linkage to the jury ...." Id. at 1212.
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The case reached the Supreme Court, where Justice Scalia,
writing for the six-Justice majority, characterized the Bruton
holding as a "narrow exception" to the general principle that juries
can follow instructions to use evidence only for a limited purpose
and not for any other purpose.15 5 The majority interpreted the
Bruton holding to apply only in cases where the confession of a
nontestifying codefendant "facially incriminates" another defen-
dant.156 The Court limited Bruton in this way because it viewed
facially-incriminating confessions as posing unique problems that
contextually implicating confessions do not.157 The Court distin-
guished the facts of Richardson, noting that Williams's confession
was redacted in such a way that it was only incriminating "when
linked with evidence introduced later at trial." ' According to the
Court, where a confession is not incriminating on its face, as in
Richardson, "the judge's instruction may well be successful in
dissuading the jury from entering onto the path of inference in the
first place. '159 The majority found this presumption that juries
follow the instructions given to them to be a "pragmatic [rule] ...
rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true
than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accom-
modation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the
criminal justice process."160
155. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1987). The Court noted that there are
numerous circumstances in which a jury is instructed to ignore evidence. Some of these
circumstances include the use of an illegally obtained confession as impeachment evidence
only and the use of evidence of prior criminal convictions only for the purposes of sentencing
enhancement. See id. In such circumstances, according to the Court, the presumption that
jurors will follow instructions to use this evidence only for a limited purpose will be
sufficient. See id. The Court thus held that the Bruton rationale-that juries cannot follow
limiting instructions when a codefendant's confession is "facially incriminating"-apphed
only in limited circumstances, and the Court refused to extend it beyond those cases where
it "validly applies." See id. at 211.
156. See id. at 208.
157. See id. ("Specific testimony that 'the defendant helped me commit the crime' is more
vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult to thrust out of mind."). On the
other hand, when a confession does not name or facially incriminate a defendant, a limiting
instruction is adequate to protect the defendant's rights. See id. at 211.
158. Id. at 208.
159. Id. The majority chastised the dissent for focusing on whether the confession itself
was incriminating, as, according to the majority, the issue was not "whether the confession
incriminated [Marsh], but ... whether the trial court could properly assume the jury did not
use it against her." Id. at 208 n.3.
160. Id. at 211.
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The concern with practicality also figured into the Court's
rejecting of contextual implication analysis: Besides being an
improper extension of Bruton, contextual implication analysis
would also be difficult to apply, in the Court's view. According to the
majority, it would be nearly impossible to predict whether a
confession would be admissible at trial under the contextual
implication standard regardless of whether the confession was
redacted. 6' The Court likewise questioned the logic and potential
consequences of forcing the judge to assess the confession's
admissibility at the end of the government's case,162 and it rejected
pretrial assessment as a potential solution to these difficulties.'63
The Court, echoing the dissent in Bruton, also stressed the
benefits and efficiency of holding joint trials and rejected the notion
that severance was an acceptable solution."6 4 The Court explained
that joint trials accounted for "almost one-third of federal criminal
trials in the [previous] five years,"'6 5 and that confessions in multi-
defendant trials, such as those involving large-scale drug conspira-
cies, were "commonplace." '6 As the Court suggested:
It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the
criminal justice system to require, in all these cases of joint
crimes where incriminating statements exist, that prosecutors
bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again
and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the
inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and
161. See id. at 209 ("If extended to confessions incriminating by connection, not only is
that [redaction] not possible, but it is not even possible to predict the admissibility of a
confession in advance of trial.").
162. See id. ('The 'contextual implication' doctrine ... would presumably require the trial
judge to assess at the end of each trial whether, in light of all of the evidence, a nontestifying
codefendant's confession has been so 'powerfully incriminating' that a new, separate trial is
required for the defendant. This obviously lends itself to manipulation by the defense - and
even without manipulation will result in numerous mistrials and appeals.").
163. See id. ("[lIt would be time consuming and obviously far from foolproof' to hold "a
pretrial hearing at which prosecution and defense would reveal the evidence they plan to
introduce, enabling the court to assess compliance with Bruton ex ante rather than expost.").
164. See id. ("[Assuring compliance with Bruton by trying the defendants separately] is
not as facile or as just a remedy as might seem.").
165. Id.
166. Id. As the Court explained, "indeed the probability of confession increases with the
number of participants, since each has reduced assurance that he will be protected by his
own silence." Id. at 209-10.
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randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the
advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. 167
The Court also stressed the concern that holding separate trials
whenever there is a confession that incriminates more than just the
confessor would result in inconsistent verdicts. 161 The Court
likewise rejected the alternative to severance: simply omitting the
confession altogether. The Court found the cost to prosecutors of
forgoing the use of confessions to be too high."6 9
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, in which he
was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens criticized the Court's distinction between facially
incriminating confessions and those that implicate a codefendant
only in light of other evidence, suggesting that the application of
this distinction would lead to absurd results.17' As Justice Stevens
wrote, "[tihe difference between the facts of Bruton and the facts of
this case does not eliminate their common, substantial, and
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury, when resolving a
critical issue against [Marsh], may have relied on impermissible
evidence.'' Justice Stevens advocated extending the "powerfully
incriminating" rule explicated in Bruton to situations in which a
confession, when read in light of the other evidence, leads the jury
"down 'the path of inference"' as to the involvement of a
nonconfessing codefendant. 72 Under this standard, according to
Justice Stevens, the decision to admit Williams's redacted confes-
sion was error. As the dissent pointed out, without linking the
167. Id. at 210.
168. See id.
169. See id. ("That price also is too high, since confessions 'are more than merely
"desirable"; they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and
punishing those who violate the law.' (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,426 (1986))).
170. Justice Stevens noted that in some circumstances it might be the case that an
indirect reference, one which only becomes inculpatory as other evidence is introduced, might
be more damaging than a direct reference to the codefendant in a confession. Requiring the
exclusion of only the latter confession, as the majority's holding would do, was an "illogical
result [that] demeans the values protected by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 212 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 216-17.
172. Id. at 213. Justice Stevens pointed out the majority's "tacit" recognition that the jury
would sometimes be led to speculate, which he contended was a violation of the
Confrontation Clause no different than that in Bruton. See id. at 213-14.
370 (Vol. 48:345
2006] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEUTRAL PRONOUN REDACTION 371
victim's testimony to the confession, there was little to no evidence
to demonstrate that Marsh either had the intent to rob and kill the
victims or knew the others involved had such an intent. 7 ' For this
reason, the dissent found it too difficult to believe that the jury
ignored this inferential connection in deciding Marsh's guilt merely
because the judge had instructed it to do so. 174
The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's contention
that extending the Bruton rule to cases like Richardson would
create too heavy a burden on prosecutors; noting that "[o]n the
scales of justice, ... considerations of fairness normally outweigh
administrative concerns."7 8 The dissenters also questioned the data
presented by the majority, noting that although one-third of all
federal prosecutions in the preceding five years had been joint
trials, there was no indication in the statistics as to how many
times a confession was offered. 176 The dissent likewise questioned
the majority's concerns about the repetition of evidence and the
burden on witnesses of testifying multiple times, noting that such
"speculation also floats unattached to any anchor of reality."' 77
According to the dissenters, it would be possible for judges in
situations like that in Richardson to simply postpone the admission
of the confession until the close of the prosecution's case, at which
time it would be possible to determine whether the admission of the
confession would be consistent with Bruton. 71
173. See id. at 214-16 (discussing the evidence that concerns Marsh's intent and what she
may have heard). According to the dissent, "[i]t is unrealistic to believe that the jury would
assume that respondent did not accompany the two men in the car but had just magically
appeared at the front door of the apartment at the same time that Martin did." Id. at 216 n.3.
174. Id. at 214.
175. Id. at 217.
176. See id. at 218-19 for a discussion of the statistics employed by the majority and why
they are misleading.
177. Id. at 219 n.7.
178. See id. at 220. The dissenters rejected the majority's concerns that such a procedure
would allow defense attorneys to manipulate its evidence to make it appear that the
confession is "powerfully incriminating," noting that a strategy designed to "enhance the
prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession" is extremely risky. See id. The dissent also
took a rhetorical swipe at the majority based on its belief that trial judges would not be
capable of managing the attorneys to prevent such problems and manipulation. According
to the dissent, trial judges are often more than competent in managing trials and supervising
attorneys "in order to avoid the problems that seem insurmountable to appellate judges who
are sometimes distracted by illogical distinctions and irrelevant statistics." Id.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:345
B. The Difficulties of Applying Richardson
Much like Bruton, Richardson's failure to fully address the issues
related to the admissibility of confessions led to confusion among
the lower courts. In deciding Richardson, the Court expressly
declined to answer the question of whether any form of redaction
short of completely eliminating any mention of the codefendant
would be permissible under the Bruton rule. In a footnote to its
opinion, the Court specifically stated that "[w]e express no opinion
on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's name
has been replaced with a symbol or a neutral pronoun." '179 Given
the Court's failure to decide what methods of redaction were
permissible, some federal and state courts elected to permit the
use of symbols8 0 or pronouns' as substitutes for the names of
codefendants." 2 Other courts rejected anything short of complete
redaction. "' In determining whether the various redaction methods
comported with Bruton's "powerfully incriminating" standard,
appellate courts were divided between two modes of analysis: the
"degree of inference test"" and the "invitation to speculate test."'"
179. Id. at 211 n.5 (majority opinion).
180. See, e.g., Robinson v. Rose, 823 F.2d 553, 1987 WL 38091 at *3 (6th Cir. 1987)
(unpublished table decision) (permitting the use of the word "blank" as a method of
redaction); Commonwealth v. Lee, 662 A.2d 645,651-52 (Pa. 1995) (permitting the use of"X"
in place of codefendant's name).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 700 (2d Cir. 1991) ("another guy");
United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1192 (4th Cir. 1990) ("client"); United States v. Garcia,
836 F.2d 385, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1987) ("someone").
182. Professor Ritter contends that the acceptance of such methods was founded on an
inappropriate reading of the decision in Richardson. See Ritter, supra note 45, at 887
(describing the "inappropriate broadening of Richardson"). Professor Ritter's article, which
was published shortly before Gray was decided, provides an in-depth analysis of the state of
Bruton immediately before Gray.
183. See, e.g., State v. Littlejohn, 459 S.E.2d 629, 632 (N.C. 1995) ("[B]efore a confession
of a nontestifying defendant is admitted into evidence, all portions of the confession which
implicate a codefendant must be deleted.").
184. See Ritter, supra note 45, at 899 (defining the "degree of inference test": "[W]hen a
co-defendant's confession is redacted by substituting a pronoun or symbol for a jointly tried
defendant's name, a reviewing court must evaluate the likelihood that the disguised
reference will be unmasked by the jury").
185. See id. at 899-900 (explaining that under the 'invitation to speculate test,"
confessions are prohibited "when the form of the redaction invites the jury to speculate about
the identity of anonymously mentioned accomplices ... [and that] [t]ypically, an 'invitation
to speculate' exists when the jury's attention is called to the fact that names, known to the
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In light of the competing views and the confusion among the lower
courts, the Court was once again required to reevaluate the Bruton
line of cases.
C. Answering the Unanswered Questions: Gray v. Maryland
Gray v. Maryland' presented the Court with the opportunity to
determine the scope of the Richardson ruling and to answer the
question it had specifically left open in Richardson: whether symbol
or neutral pronoun redaction was an acceptable method of compli-
ance with the Bruton-Richardson line of cases.'87 In Gray, three
men-Gray, Bell, and Vanlandingham-were charged with beating
Stacey Williams to death.'88 Gray and Bell were tried jointly, and
at the trial, the prosecutor attempted to introduce Bell's confession
into evidence against him.8 9 The judge permitted the admission of
the confession, but ordered that it be redacted. 9 ° When the
confession was read into evidence, the detective who read it in court
substituted the words "deleted" or "deletion" for the names of Gray
and Vanlandingham.' 9 ' When the written form of the confession
was introduced, the names of Gray and Vanlandingham had been
replaced with blank spaces separated by commas.'92 Bell did not
testify. In addition to the confession, the prosecutor also introduced
witnesses who identified the three men as participants in the
prosecution, have been deleted" (footnote omitted)).
186. 523 U.S. 185 (1998).
187. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
188. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 188.
189. Vanlandingham died before the grand jury was able to indict him. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 189. Thus, a portion of the written confession, which was printed in an
appendix to the majority opinion, read as follows:
(Q) Who was in the group that beat Stacey
(A) Me, , and a few other guys
(Q) Do you have the other guys names
(A) , and me, I don't remember who was out there
(Q) Do you have a black jacket with Park Heights written on the back
(A) Yeh
(Q) Who else has these jacket [sic].
(A)
Id. at 199.
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beating, 193 as well as the testimony of the police detective, who
testified that once Bell had confessed, he was able to arrest Gray. 1
9 4
Before giving the case to the jury, the judge issued a limiting
instruction warning the jury that Bell's confession was to be
considered evidence only with regard to him and not with regard to
Gray. 9 ' Both Gray and Bell were convicted. Gray's conviction was
upheld by the highest court in Maryland, 196 and Gray appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Breyer announced the Court's decision on behalf of the
other four justices in the majority. The Court vacated Gray's
conviction, holding that the introduction of the confession violated
Gray's rights under the Confrontation Clause as defined in
Bruton.'97 According to the Court, the confession in Gray, despite its
redaction, was no different in its incriminating nature than that
in Bruton.9 ' As the Court explained, blank spaces, symbols, or
substituted words like "deleted" were not sufficient to prevent the
jurors from linking the obvious omissions in the statement to the
other defendant in the trial.'99 According to the Court, an obvious
deletion would "call the jurors' attention specially to the removed
name,"200 and all a juror would have to do is look to the defense
table to identify whose name had been redacted. 20 ' As Justice
Breyer pointed out, an obvious redaction would "encourag[e] the
193. See id. at 189.
194. See id. at 188-89 ("Immediately after the police detective read the redacted confession
to the jury, the prosecutor asked, 'after he gave you that information, you subsequently were
able to arrest Mr. Kevin Gray; is that correct?' The officer responded, That's correct.").
195. See id. at 189.
196. See State v. Gray, 687 A.2d 660,669 (Md. 1997). The intermediate court in Maryland
had initially vacated Gray's conviction, holding that the introduction of the confession
violated Bruton. See Gray v. State, 667 A.2d 983, 992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
197. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 197.
198. As the majority explained, obvious redactions are just as "directly accusatory" as the
unredacted statements in Bruton. See id. at 194. As such, the confession "closely resemble[d]
Bruton's unredacted statements." Id. at 192.
199. See id. at 192-93.
200. Id. at 193.
201. See id. Justice Breyer also explained that such a redaction might hurt the
prosecutor's argument for the reliability of the confession, as "[a] more sophisticated juror,
wondering if the blank space refers to someone else, might also wonder how, if it did, the
prosecutor could argue the confession is reliable, for the prosecutor, after all, has been
arguing that Jones, not someone else, helped Smith commit the crime." Id.
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jury to speculate about the reference," 2  which in turn might
"overemphasize the importance of the confession's accusation-once
the jurors work out the reference."20 3 It was because of the danger
of speculation that the Court found the confession in Gray, as well
as the entire practice of symbol redaction, to be prohibited under
Bruton.20 4
The Court, in finding symbol redaction insufficient to protect the
rights of a defendant, distinguished the confession in Gray from
that in Richardson: Bell's confession, despite the redactions, still
referred to the existence of Gray,0 5 whereas the confession in
Richardson had been purged of all indicia of the existence of any
other person. The Court concluded that Richardson did not place all
inferentially incriminating statements outside the scope of Bruton's
protections." e Rather, "the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference"
was what mattered.0 7 In Richardson, the confession made only
indirect references to the codefendant and became incriminating
only when linked to other evidence at trial, while in Gray the
confession was redacted in such a way as to "obviously refer directly
202. Id. This concern about speculation was consistent with the test for implication that
had been termed the "invitation to speculate test." See Ritter, supra note 45, at 908 ("The
'invitation to speculate' test calls for an assessment of whether the method of redaction is
likely to convey to the jury that the names of known accomplices have been intentionally
covered up.").
203. Gray, 523 U.S. at 193. Judge Hand expressed a similar concern about the danger of
obvious deletions overemphasizing the connection between the missing name and the other
defendant in his opinion in Delli Paoli: "[There could not have been the slightest doubt as
to whose names had been blacked out; and, even if there had been, the blacking out itself
would have not only laid the doubt, but underscored the answer." United States v. Deli
Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956).
204. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 195. As the Court explained, "we believe that, considered as a
class, redactions that replace a proper name with an obvious blank, the word 'delete,' a
symbol, or similarly notify the jury that a name has been deleted are similar enough to
Bruton's unredacted confessions as to warrant the same legal results." Id. The Court found
the admission of Bell's confession to be a particularly egregious error owing to the fact that
the prosecutor's question following the reading of the confession "eliminated all doubt" as to
the identity of the name that had been removed. See id. at 194.
205. See id. at 192.
206. See id. at 195-96. Indeed, the Court found that such a broad reading of Richardson
would be inconsistent with its precedent, which assumed that Bruton prohibited the
introduction of confessions that used truncated first names, nicknames, or physical
descriptions in place of names despite the fact that some inference was needed to connect
these substitutions with the defendant. See id. (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
253 (1969)).
207. Id. at 196.
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to someone, often obviously the defendant, and ... involve[d]
inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately."2 °s
Although the indirect inference in Richardson did not implicate
Bruton's Sixth Amendment protections, the direct inference in Gray
did.2"9 The Court suggested that more could have been done to
protect Gray, such as removing all references to the codefendants,
as had been done in Richardson.1 ° But more was not done, and
because it was likely that the jury ignored its limiting instruction
and connected the blank spaces to Gray, the confession had been
impermissibly admitted, according to the Court, in light of
Bruton.21'
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he echoed
his opinion in Richardson that Bruton was a "narrow exception" to
the general proposition that juries will heed limiting instruc-
tions.212 Justice Scalia questioned how the Court could accept that
Richardson permitted confessions that were only inferentially
incriminating and still prohibit the confession in Gray, which the
Court admitted required inference to connect the defendant to the
confession. 213 Reiterating his opinion in Richardson, Justice Scalia
suggested that a confession is "facially incriminating" only when it
incriminates a defendant "independent of other evidence introduced
at trial."'214 As long as the confession did not specifically mention
Gray, Justice Scalia contended, it could not be deemed "facially
incriminating"; mere speculation as to the identity of "deleted" was
not sufficient to prohibit the use of the confession. 5 The dissent
rejected the majority's reliance on the "invitation to speculate"
208. Id.
209. The Court suggested that the confession in Gray was "facially incriminat[ing]," the
type of statement prohibited even by Richardson, because the blank was "prominent on [the
confession's] face." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987)).
210. See id. at 196-97. The Court also suggested that the testifying witness could have said
"Me and a few other guys" instead of"Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys." Id. at 196
(emphasis added). Disagreement over how to interpret this language has engendered a
debate over whether redaction by neutral pronouns or phrases would comport with Bruton.
See infra Part IV.B.
211. See id. at 190, 197.
212. Id. at 200-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 200.
214. Id. at 201.
215. Id. at 201-02. The dissenters specifically rejected the majority's comparison of the use
of the word "deleted" to the use of physical descriptions or nicknames. See id.
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standard and suggested that the important inquiry was whether
the incrimination was "powerful," not whether it caused the jury to
speculate or whether it incriminated Gray.216
Justice Scalia also criticized the practical difficulties presented
by the majority's suggestion that only total redaction would be
acceptable.217 In some cases, according to the dissent, total redac-
tion will not be possible, as it would yield results that were
"nonsensical' ' 21 or inconsistent with what was actually said in the
confession.1 9 Such a result is especially likely in conspiracy cases,
where it is necessary to connect the confessing defendant to
others.2 ° According to the dissenters, redaction with notations
where omissions had been made was a better alternative than the
majority's "total redaction" standard: 'The risk to the integrity of
our system (not to mention the increase in its complexity) posed by
the approval of such freelance editing seems to me infinitely greater
than the risk posed by the entirely honest reproduction that the
Court disapproves.' 22 '
D. Reaction to Gray
The Court's decision in Gray, while clearing up much of the
uncertainty about the application of the Bruton-Richardson line of
cases, was both criticized by scholars who thought the ruling either
went too far in protecting the efficiency of the courts or did not go
far enough to protect the rights of defendants in joint trials, and
extolled by those who thought it achieved an adequate balance
216. See id. at 202. The dissenters also suggested that the statement might not be as
incriminating as the majority suggested, as "there were two names deleted, five or more
participants in the crime, and only one other defendant on trial." Id.
217. See id. at 203.
218. Id.
219. See id. ("Introducing the statement with full disclosure of deletions is one thing;
introducing as the complete statement what was in fact only a part is something else.").
220. According to Justice Scalia:
If the question was "Who agreed to beat Stacey?", and the answer was 'Me and
Kevin," we might redact the answer to 'ie and [deleted]," or perhaps to "Me
and somebody else," but surely not to just '%Me"-for that would no longer be a
confession to the conspiracy charge, but rather the foundation for an insanity
defense.
Id.
221. Id. at 203-04.
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between the two. One commentator referred to the decision as a
"partial victory for criminal defendants" and "a lucky card for
prosecutors." '222 Another suggested that although the Court's failure
to reject the "facially incriminating" rule set forth in Richardson
ultimately put the policy interests in efficiency ahead of the rights
of the accused, Gray was still more protective of defendants' rights
than Richardson.22 Yet another commentator predicted difficulties
in applying the standard set forth in Gray, given the Court's failure
to define which kinds of inferences are permissible.224 Those who
lauded the decision were pleased with the balance the Court
achieved between protecting defendants' rights and preserving the
efficiency of the courts.225
IV. WHAT To Do WITH "THE GUY": NEUTRAL PRONOUN REDACTION
AND THE BRUTON PROBLEM AFTER GRAY
A. The Problem of Neutral Pronoun Redaction: A Hypothetical
Following the Gray ruling, courts began using neutral pronoun
redaction as a way to constitutionally utilize codefendant confes-
222. See Jennifer S. Lue, Note, Gray v. Maryland: The Revival of Confrontation or the
Maintenance of Judicial Efficiency?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1205, 1224-25 (1999)
(criticizing the Court for misapplying the "powerfully incriminating" standard and suggesting
a "compelling inference" standard).
223. See Richard F. Dzubin, Casenote, The Extension of the Bruton Rule at the Expense
of Judicial Efficiency in Gray v. Maryland, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 227, 256 (1999). The author
expressed concern that some confessions, although not incriminating on their face, might still
incriminate the defendant in light of other evidence; such confessions would be admissible
even under the reinterpreted version of the Bruton rule. See id. Despite these concerns,
however, the author believes that the Gray decision will ultimately require more severed
trials and better redaction, thus offering more protection to the rights of defendants than was
recognized under Richardson. See id.
224. See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The Future of Codefendant Confessions, 30 SETON HALL
L. REV. 516, 549-50 (2000) (suggesting that although Gray did not go far enough in setting
forth a clear rule, it did suggest that the Court might be considering a new approach to its
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
225. See, e.g., Gabrielle Benadi, Supreme Court Review: All Aboard the Bruton Line, 89
J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 837,864-65 (1999) (commending the Court on setting an easy-to-
apply bright-line rule which had "many advantages and virtually no apparent disadvantages"
and which moderated between the desire to preserve joint trials and the need to protect
defendants' rights).
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sions.22 s This method of redaction is best illustrated through a
hypothetical situation. Bob, Jane, John, and Mary are four accom-
plices in a bank robbery. All four are arrested and charged with the
robbery. After arrest, Bob gives a statement to the police; assume
that his statement is voluntarily given and that the police acted in
compliance with the procedures defined by Miranda. In his
statement, Bob states the following: "We all had guns and ski
masks. Jane waited in the car while John, Mary, and I went into
the bank. John took care of the cameras while Mary and I took the
money from the safe and put it in a bag." At the joint trial of the
four defendants, evidence is introduced that a witness saw Jane in
the car and that John's fingerprints were on the video cameras in
the bank. Bob refuses to testify, but both Jane and John testify that
they were out to dinner together rather than at the scene of the
crime. Mary does not testify.
Given the holding in Bruton, the introduction of Bob's confession
as is would not be permissible, as it was given by a nontestifying
codefendant and names other defendants explicitly. Likewise, if the
statement were redacted to read "[deleted] waited in the car while
X, , and I went into the bank," the confession would be inadmissi-
ble in light of Gray. If the same statement were redacted to read
simply "I went into the bank," it would not be facially incriminat-
ing, and, like the confession in Richardson, would be admissible as
long as it were accompanied by a limiting instruction. Much of the
confession's meaning would be lost as a result of the redaction,
however, a result that Justice Scalia might criticize as "nonsensi-
cal. 227
The same statement redacted using neutral pronouns would
read: "We all had guns and ski masks. Someone waited in the car
while the others and I went into the bank. Somebody took care of
the cameras while another person and I took the money from the
safe and put it in a bag." All references to the other defendants have
been replaced. Whether this type of redaction comports with the
Bruton-Richardson-Gray line of cases is unclear given the Court's
jurisprudence.
226. This redaction method, though discussed in Gray, was not specifically prohibited by
the Court. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
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B. Neutral Pronoun Redaction and the Inconsistent Application of
Bruton
The neutral pronoun question arose because of the limited nature
of the Court's decision in Gray. Although the Court specifically held
that symbol redaction was per se unconstitutional, it did not
address the issue of neutral pronoun redaction.22 A brief passage
in the Gray opinion, however, has been offered by those who claim
the Court intended to permit neutral pronoun redaction. In Gray,
the Court suggested that the testifying witness could have said, 'Me
and a few other guys" instead of "Me, deleted, deleted, and a few
other guys."229 Though this language was intended to demonstrate
the feasibility of redacting all references to the other defendants, it
has been interpreted-or rather misinterpreted-to mean that the
Court substituted "a few other guys" for the names. This has
engendered a debate over whether redaction by neutral pronouns
or phrases would comport with Bruton."30
The lack of clarity as to what the Court meant by this passage
resulted in a split in appellate and state courts over whether the
use of neutral pronouns is acceptable. Some circuits have permitted
the practice of neutral pronoun redaction. The Eighth Circuit, for
example, permitted the use of "another individual" in the place of
a codefendant's name despite the fact that the confession became
incriminating in light of other evidence introduced at the trial.23'
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit found that a confession in which the
228. Jennifer Lue contends that the Court answered the neutral pronoun question in Gray
and created a per se rule of exclusion. See Lue, supra note 222, at 1224. There is nothing in
the opinion that explicitly supports this contention.
229. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196 (1998) (emphasis added).
230. The dissent tacitly sanctioned such redaction, noting that replacing "'Me and Kevin'"
with "Me and somebody else- might be sufficient to protect the defendant's rights. See id.
at 203 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. See United States v. Logan, 210 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding the statement
was not "powerfully incriminating" because "there was no indication whatever that there had
been a redaction: Mr. Roan's statement was an oral one, and the detective simply testified
that Mr. Roan said that 'another individual' had been in on the planning and commission of
the offense"); see also United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 2003)
(permitting substitution of "someone" for defendant's name in codefendant's confession if
accompanied by a jury instruction); United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1125-26 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that use of "we" and "they" to replace a confessing defendant's inculpatory
references to her codefendants, accompanied by a limiting instruction, was consistent with
the holding in Gray).
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codefendant's nickname had been replaced with the phrase "another
person" did not violate Bruton and Gray.2 32 The Fourth Circuit has
also approved the use of neutral pronouns or phrases, having found
the use of the term "associates" as a substitute for a codefendant's
name to be permissible.233 The Ninth Circuit sanctioned the use
of neutral pronouns, holding that the use of "we," "our," and "they"
did not violate the defendants' rights under the Confrontation
Clause.234 Other redactions that have been approved in lower courts
include the use of the phrases "another person"23 and "more than
one."236 Some state courts, such as those in Pennsylvania, have also
approved the use of neutral pronoun redaction and permitted the
substitution of phrases like "the other guy" for the names of
codefendants.23 7
Other courts have read Gray to establish a much more stringent
standard: only fully redacted confessions are permissible.238 These
courts have rejected neutral pronoun redaction. The Seventh
Circuit, for example, concluded that introducing a codefendant's
confession with the word "another" in place of the defendant's name
232. See United States v. Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the redaction of the defendant's nickname and replacing it with a neutral
pronoun phrase comports with Bruton and Gray, as the identity of the codefendant was not
obvious from the confession itself). According to the circuit court:
[W]here a defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun or phrase there
is no Bruton violation, providing that the incrimination of the defendant is only
by reference to evidence other than the redacted statement and a limiting
instruction is given to the jury. Where, however, it is obvious from
consideration of the confession as a whole that the redacted term was a
reference to the defendant, then admission of the confession violates Bruton,
regardless of whether the redaction was accomplished by use of a neutral
pronoun or otherwise.
Id. at 1214.
233. See United States v. Smith, 172 F.3d 865, at *7 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision).
234. See United States v. Berrara-Medina, 139 F.App'x 786, 794-96 (9th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished opinion) (holding that use of neutral pronouns did not obviously implicate the
defendants and that confession was admissible despite other testimony that might have
linked defendants to the confession).
235. See United States v. Akinoye, 174 F.3d 451, 456-57 (4th Cir. 1999).
236. See United States v. Barroso, 108 F. Supp. 2d 338, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
237. See Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 878 A.2d 914, 920 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
238. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 126, at 858 ("Richardson was the only Supreme
Court case that has approved of a specific form of redaction: redaction that omits all
reference to the defendant's existence.").
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was impermissible under Gray.19 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found
that redaction substituting the word "someone" violated the
defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment. 24 ' The Third
Circuit24' and Sixth Circuit2 42 have also rejected neutral pronoun
redaction. Some state courts have adopted this per se rejection of
neutral pronouns as well. Georgia, for example, has refused to
permit confessions that use "someone" and "anybody" in place of a
defendant's name.243
C. The Case for Neutral Pronoun Redaction
1. Neutral Pronouns Are Different, and Should Be Treated as
Such.
Some scholars have suggested that the solution to the neutral
pronoun question is to prohibit the use of neutral pronoun redaction
entirely.244 The arguments in support of this position are based in
part on the similarity between the type of redaction prohibited in
Gray and the use of neutral pronouns. 245 Neutral pronouns such as
"someone" and "the others," however, are different from symbols
and blank spaces in constitutionally significant ways, as they
239. See United States v. Eskeridge, 164 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that use
of "another" in redacted confession violated Bruton in light of Gray, but that the admission
of the redacted confession was harmless error in light of the other evidence in the case).
240. See United States v. Vejar-Urias, 165 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that use
of "someone" in redaction violated defendant's rights because it divulged her identity even
"without reference to other evidence" and because no limiting instruction was given to the
jury).
241. See United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding violation of
the Confrontation Clause when the confession was redacted to replace codefendants' names
with "friend" and "inside man," as the references obviously referred to the codefendants).
242. See Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that use of "other
person" in redacted confession did not prevent the jury from inferring that the confession
referred to the defendant).
243. See Davis v. State, 528 S.E.2d 800,805-06 (Ga. 2000); see also Richardson, supra note
126, at 862 (noting that North Carolina and Georgia have adopted the approach that only
confessions in which "all references to codefendants' existence are omitted" are admissible
under Bruton).
244. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 126, at 866; Ritter, supra note 45, at 915 ("A per se
rule prohibiting neutral pronoun ... redactions is necessary to protect adequately the
confrontation rights of the implicated defendant.!).
245. See Richardson, supra note 126, at 859 (noting the similarities between the redaction
in Gray and neutral pronoun redaction).
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neither are directly accusatory nor compel speculation.246 The
Court's concern in Gray was that redaction using the word "deleted"
or the blank space directly implicated a codefendant and alerted the
jury to the omission of a name such that it would undoubtedly
speculate as to the identity of "deleted." '47 The Court refused to
allow symbol redaction because obvious redactions are just as
"directly accusatory" as the unredacted statements in Bruton.24
Neutral pronoun redaction does not present the same problems
as symbol redaction.249 In the hypothetical discussed earlier, the
phrase "Someone waited in the car while the others and I went into
the bank," though clearly suggesting the involvement of others in
the crime, is not an obvious redaction and does not compel the
inference that "someone" was Jane or that "the others" were John
and Mary.25° These phrases may only become incriminating when
viewed in light of other evidence; the witness's statement that he
saw Jane in the car, for example, is the only factor that reveals
"someone" to be Jane. Such incrimination only through contextual
linkage, however, does not violate defendants' rights, according to
the Court in Richardson; confessions are incriminating only if the
statement itself "powerfully incriminates" the other defendant.
Neutral pronouns do not "obviously refer directly to someone, often
obviously the defendant,"251 in the way that an obvious deletion
marked by a blank space does. The Court's distinction between
obvious deletions and those, like neutral pronouns, that do not
obviously incriminate another person, is, therefore, one of constitu-
246. See Ritter, supra note 45, at 894 ("The presence of a blank or 'X' becomes a red flag
inviting the jury to play detective and attempt to figure out or speculate concerning the
identity of the mystery accomplice.").
247. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998) (holding that an obvious deletion would
"call the jurors' attention specially to the removed name").
248. See id. at 194.
249. See Ritter, supra note 45, at 893-94 ("[B]lanks or 'X' say to the jury that a name once
contained in the confession has been removed and is being kept secret from them. The use
of words like 'another' or 'someone' leaves open the possibility that the unidentified
accomplice was never actually named by the co-defendant.").
250. This form of redaction does not "notify the jury that a name has been deleted" in the
same way that using a symbol or a blank space would. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 195. It is much
less obvious that such a statement has been altered because it is much more likely that a
defendant would say "me and the other guy did it" than it is that he would say to the
arresting officer that "me and X did it."
251. Id. at 196.
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tional significance. Because neutral pronouns do not compel the
inference that a nonconfessing codefendant is the person to whom
"the other person" or "someone" refers, their use ought- not be
restricted by the Court's pronouncement concerning symbol
redaction in Gray.
Those who find the use of neutral pronoun redaction unconstitu-
tional advocate either severing the trials, not using the confession,
or completely redacting the confession-as in Richardson-as a way
to avoid conflict.252 These suggestions ignore the burden this "sever
or never" rule would place on prosecutors and judicial resources, as
well as the difficulties of full redaction.
The "sever" approach is not an adequate solution because joint
trials are efficient. 3 and can be necessary in certain circumstances.
Joint trials obviate the need to have witnesses come to testify
multiple times, which in some cases, as with extremely traumatic
experiences or where the witness is a child, can be an unnecessarily
difficult task.254 There is also the possibility that having separate
trials could result in different verdicts for defendants charged with
252. Some courts and scholars have also advocated using separate juries in Bruton
situations: one for the confessing defendant, which would hear his confession separately; and
another for the balance of the trial. According to Professor Mueller, "when the confession of
one defendant is offered, the jury for another is out of the room." Mueller, supra note 10, at
957. The separate jury option has drawbacks that make it an unappealing alternative,
however:
This approach [of using multiple juries] sometimes works, but it is hard to
manage because: (a) courts are ill-designed for it; (b) such trials are hard to
orchestrate (references to confessions may be made any time); and (c) it is hard
to keep juries separated so that what one has heard does not come to the
attention of another.
Id.
253. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968) ("Joint trials do conserve state
funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in
bringing those accused of crime to trial."). For a critique of the efficiency rationale, see Robert
0. Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies and
Prejudices, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1379 (1979).
254. Professor Dawson suggests that the fact that most witnesses are professionals
undercuts this rationale, but this argument is far from convincing, especially in cases where
a child was molested, for example. See Dawson, supra note 253, at 1384-85. His suggestion
that parties merely stipulate to certain testimony in these cases ignores both the tactical
advantages of having a witness testify as well as the requirement that a defendant be able
to cross-examine his accuser. See id. at 1385. Furthermore, it is only fair to let the jury
evaluate the credibility of a witness's statement after viewing him in court.
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the same conduct.256 The strongest attack by most opponents of
joint trials posits that joining trials does not in fact conserve courts'
time and resources because joint trials may be more complicated
than individual trials." 6 While this argument certainly has some
validity, it becomes less relevant when one considers that under
certain circumstances it may be necessary, given the nature of the
crime, to try the defendants together. Such is the case in conspiracy
or racketeering cases, in which it is necessary to establish a
connection between the various parties.257
The "never" approach would fail as well. Those who advocate that
a confession not be used if the defendants are to be tried jointly
ignore the fact that a freely and voluntarily given confession is often
the best evidence of what occurred.2 58 To put prosecutors in the
position where they must ignore the most competent, and fre-
quently the only substantial, evidence in a trial merely because it
is more efficient or practical to conduct a trial jointly is unconscio-
nable.
The third alternative proposed by those who contend that neutral
pronoun redaction violates the dictates of Bruton is to completely
redact the references to the codefendants. 9 The problem with this
approach is that complete redaction may not be practical, and
attempts to eliminate all references to a codefendant can often lead
255. Professor Dawson claims that this argument is too weak to stand, but his statement
that "if different lawyers have represented defendants in sequential trials, differences in
their competency, zeal, or preparation may affect the juries' verdicts" seems to support,
rather than undercut, the danger of inconsistent verdicts. See id. at 1391-92.
256. See id. at 1385-86 (arguing that joint trials are more difficult to schedule, more
complicated to conduct, and take longer than individual trials).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir. 2005) (recommending
that "defendants who are 'charged in a conspiracy should be tried together, particularly
where proof of the charges against the defendants is based upon the same evidence and acts"
(quoting United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 1979))).
258. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. But see Richardson, supra note 126, at
860-61 (pointing out and discussing the dangers of assuming that a confession is an accurate
depiction of what actually happened and noting that codefendants frequently try to shift the
blame to the others involved in the crime, making the statements, whether redacted or not,
of questionable reliability).
259. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (holding that admission of a
confession in which all references to codefendants were completely redacted, thus eliminating
"any reference to [their] existence," did not violate the Confrontation Clause); see also Bryant
M. Richardson, Rebuttal, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 969, 969 (suggesting that "the only form of
redaction that passes constitutional muster is redaction that removes all references to the
existence of the codefendants").
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to absurd or inconsistent results. Justice Scalia addressed this
approach in Gray, noting that redacting all references in that case
would have yielded a statement that was inconsistent with what
actually transpired during the course of the crime.26 °
This third point is illustrated if we return to the hypothetical set
out at the beginning of this part. In Bob's confession, he stated that
"We all had guns and ski masks. Jane waited in the car while John,
Mary, and I went into the bank." If the statement were completely
redacted, it would read "I went into the bank," which does not
accurately depict the events that transpired.26' Although that
statement, as redacted, might be acceptable because it makes sense
and accurately describes Bob's role in the crime, confessions do not
always lend themselves to easy redaction.262 If, for example, Bob
had said, "Mary told me that John would get the cameras and that
she and I should get the money," there would be no way to remove
all references to the other defendants without destroying what was
actually said and transpired. The prosecutor is then left with the
choice to either rewrite the sentence to make it grammatically
correct, eliminate the sentence entirely, or choose not to use the
confession.263 The first two choices fail to respect the integrity of
what was actually said, and the third penalizes the prosecutor
because the police did not ask the questions in such a way as to
yield redactable responses.
260. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
261. Indeed, as Professor Mueller points out, it is possible that such complete redaction
can make the defendant's conduct seem more egregious and culpable than it actually was.
See Mueller, supra note 10, at 963 (describing how redaction in a murder case exaggerated
the role of a minor player in the crime). According to Professor Mueller, "[t]here are some
cases where redaction is unfair to other defendants, even if the resultant confession contains
no words that could refer to them." Id. As he explains, "[j]ust as silent moments in a
symphony or song can have great meaning, so the absence of words in a longer narration can
have as much impact as the words themselves." Id.
262. According to one author, "comprehensive editing, although it protects the
nonconfessor, casts confusion and saps the confession of probative value so as to prejudice
the prosecutor's case." Codefendants'Confessions, 3 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 80,89 (1967).
This article presents an in-depth discussion of the difficulties of requiring complete redaction.
See id. at 88-90.
263. Such modification by the prosecutor raises the concern that he may, whether
inadvertently or intentionally, remove portions of the confession that may benefit the
defendant. As Professor Mueller points out, "the one who made the confession may have
objections if its wording is changed to delete part of what he said that bears on the case."
Mueller, supra note 10, at 957.
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2. A Jury Instruction Is Sufficient
The fact that neutral pronouns are different from symbols
requires a reexamination of the jury instruction issue in light of
these differences. The central issue that underscored the Bruton-
Richardson-Gray line of cases was whether it was reasonable to
presume jurors could follow instructions to ignore "powerfully
incriminating" evidence and whether a jury instruction was
sufficient to protect the rights of a defendant. Bruton's premise was
that some extrajudicial statements are so "powerfully incriminat-
ing" that juries may be unable to follow instructions to ignore them
when deciding the guilt of the nonconfessing defendants they
implicate.264 Gray extended this rule to symbol redaction, finding
that the danger that a jury would infer from a symbol the existence
and complicity of a codefendant to be too great to be dispelled by a
limiting instruction.265 Richardson limited the extension of this
rule, however, holding that a limiting instruction is sufficient in all
circumstances except when a confession is "powerfully incriminat-
ing" on its face.266
As previously discussed, it is difficult to support the proposition
that neutral pronouns are "powerfully incriminating" in the same
way as symbols, given the fact that neutral pronouns do not compel
the inference that a name was removed and do not directly
incriminate a codefendant just by examining the face of the
confession. As such, a jury more likely will be able to ignore the
suggested inferential connection between a phrase like "someone"
and a codefendant than the connection between a symbol like "X"
and a codefendant. While the Bruton court found that the presump-
tion that jurors could follow instructions was unreasonable in
certain circumstances, its holding has indeed proven to be a
"narrow exception," as the Court has not explicitly rejected the
presumption as unreasonable in all circumstances.267 Indeed, the
264. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
265. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998).
266. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (finding limiting instruction
sufficient where all references to codefendant were removed).
267. Some argue that reliance on the presumption that jurors follow instructions is
misplaced and may actually be detrimental to the rights of defendants. See, e.g.,
Codefendants' Confessions, supra note 262, at 82 ("The effectiveness of limiting instructions
in ensuring that a jury does not improperly consider a confession is highly suspect."); Judith
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proposition put forth in Delli Paoli still holds true: "It is a basic
premise of our jury system that the court states the law to the jury
and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the jury finds
them. 268
Courts presume juries follow instructions in other circumstances
in which the evidence sought to be limited is far more likely to be
used in an impermissible fashion than is the case with neutral
pronouns. One such example was discussed by the Court in Harris
v. New York, in which the Court permitted the introduction of an
improperly obtained confession for the limited purpose of impeach-
ment as long as the jury was instructed not to consider it as
evidence of the confessor's guilt.26 9 The jury was presumed to follow
this instruction. Similarly, the Federal Rules of Evidence permit the
introduction of character evidence and past act evidence solely for
the purpose of assessing credibility.27 ° Juries are instructed as to
the limited purpose for such evidence, and they are presumed to use
the evidence for this purpose only and not in considering the
defendant's guilt or innocence.27' Despite these examples, blind
reliance on the proposition that jurors follow instructions would be
fool-hardy. In light of the many instances in which an instruction
is considered sufficient, however, many of which are far more likely
than neutral pronoun redaction to be prejudicial, it is not unreason-
able to presume that jurors can suppress their instinct to connect
the word "someone" to a codefendant in a case where a confession
has been redacted using neutral pronouns. Because neutral
L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving ... But the Words Aren't Clear: Dissecting the Presumption
that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004) (examining the basis
for the presumption that jurors can follow instructions and suggesting that "[j]ustice is not
advanced by the judiciary's reliance on an unsupported and false presumption"). See also
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932), in which Judge Hand referred to
the concept that a jury can follow a limiting instruction in all circumstances as "the
recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers,
but anybody's else [sic]."
268. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1956).
269. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223, 225 (1971).
270. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
271. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1967) (holding that evidence of prior
criminal acts was admissible for the purpose of determining the defendant's sentence). The
Court in Richardson cited a number of other cases in which the jury is presumed to be able
to use various pieces of evidence for one limited purpose but to ignore it for others. See
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206-07.
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pronouns are not obvious redactions and do not compel the
incrimination of nonconfessing codefendants, a limiting instruction
is sufficient to protect the codefendants' rights.
D. A New Test
The reason that the issue of neutral pronouns has vexed and
confounded prosecutors, trial courts, and appellate courts is not
that the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a standard. On the
contrary, the problem is that there are too many standards, and
none of them is clear enough to guarantee consistent application.
Bruton called for the exclusion of "powerfully incriminating"
confessions."' Richardson held the Constitution prohibited the
admission of confessions that were incriminating on their face as
opposed to those which incriminated in light of other evidence.273
Gray applied the "facially incriminating" standard, but found a
confession that made no mention of the defendant to be "facially
incriminating" by inference." 4 What has remained constant
throughout the Court's jurisprudence, however, is the basic
premise underlying Bruton and its progeny: that some codefendant
confessions, whether redacted or not, are so "powerfully incrimi-
nating" that a jury instruction cannot prevent the jury from
impermissibly considering them as evidence against the non-
confessing defendant.275 In order to determine whether a redacted
confession can be admitted, therefore, it is necessary to formulate
a test that adequately defines and predicts when a confession is so
incriminating that a jury instruction cannot cure the prejudice
caused by its introduction. A potential solution to the problems of
analysis facing the appellate courts in light of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence is a two-pronged test that melds the standards used
by the Court and addresses all methods of redaction, including
neutral pronoun redaction. In order for a confession to be consid-
ered "powerfully incriminating," and thus inadmissible, it must
satisfy the requirements of both prongs of the test.
272. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968).
273. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207.
274. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196 (1998).
275. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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1. Prong 1: Invitation to Speculate276
Courts must first determine whether the confession, as redacted,
invites the jury to speculate that a redaction has occurred and that
a particular defendant is the one who has had his name redacted.
This is a "four corners" test-only the confession itself is to be
examined. This prong is a question of what the "reasonable juror"
would believe-whether the reasonable juror, looking only at the
confession itself, would be invited, more likely than not, to specu-
late as to the existence or true identity of a codefendant. If a
confession invites speculation, it satisfies this prong and must be
considered under the second prong. If it fails to invite speculation,
the confession would not be "powerfully incriminating" and
therefore would be admissible.
Under this prong, the confession in Richardson would clearly be
admissible. Without any references to the defendant, the jury would
have no reason to speculate as to the identity of a codefendant; no
evidence of such a person's existence would be found in the
confession. The confession in Gray would clearly induce a reason-
able juror to at least speculate as to the identity of "deleted." '277 The
confession would thus satisfy the first prong by inviting speculation
and would have to be considered under the second prong. Less
certain is the question whether a confession that is redacted using
neutral pronouns would satisfy the first prong. One could certainly
argue that a juror seeing the phrase "someone and me" would not
be aroused to speculate as to the identity of "someone," as the
redaction is not obvious. It is more likely, however, that such a
redaction would invite a juror to speculate as to the existence of a
coconspirator or accomplice, and thus the resolution of the neutral
pronoun question must depend on the answer to the second prong
of the test.
276. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 246.
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2. Prong 2: The Degree of Inference278
Those confessions that invite a reasonable juror to speculate
must next be examined to determine whether the degree of
inference is great. This prong of the test is premised on the
rationale behind the "compelling inference" standard: when the
inferential connection between the redaction and the identity of the
codefendant whose name was redacted is great, it is highly likely
that a jury will, at least unconsciously, consider the statement with
regard to the defendant.27 9 In such a circumstance, a limiting
instruction would not be enough to prevent the jury from consider-
ing the inadmissible evidence. Conversely, when the inference is so
attenuated that the inferential connection is weak, a jury more
likely could ignore the tenuous connection on orders from the judge.
The risk is not the same in the latter case as it is in the former:
when a connection is not obvious or easily discovered, it is reason-
able to expect jurors to ignore the possible inference. As with the
first prong, the standard for evaluation under this prong would be
whether the reasonable juror would be more likely than not to make
a strong inferential connection.
This prong, unlike the first, necessarily considers the totality
of the circumstances at the trial; it is, therefore, more akin to
the "contextual implication" standard than it is to the "facially
incriminating" test. Among the factors that must be considered in
evaluating the strength of the inferential connection is the method
of redaction. The confession in Bruton, for example, would clearly
satisfy this prong, and thus become inadmissible, because the
strongest of the inferential connections is clearly connecting
someone's name, as read in a confession, to the person herself.28 °
Similarly, using the word "he" as a substitute for the name of the
278. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
279. This concern was emphasized by Justice Breyer in his decision in Gray. See supra
notes 197-211 and accompanying text.
280. A redaction that completely eliminates the name and existence of the other
defendant-like that in Richardson-would create no inferential connection and would
therefore fail this prong's requirement of a strong inferential connection, thus making the
confession admissible. But as explained supra Part IV.D. 1, such a redacted confession would
likely fail to invite speculation, thus satisfying the first prong and thereby becoming
admissible; this result obviates the need to consider a Richardson-type redaction under the
second prong.
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only other defendant in the trial, who is a male, would create a
strong inferential connection and thus be inadmissible under this
prong, as would the use of the phrase "the white guy" in a trial in
which all but one of the defendants are black.28" ' Another factor to
be considered is the number of codefendants in the trial. This
consideration necessarily works in tandem with the examination of
the type of redaction. If, for example, a confession is redacted to
read "me and someone" and there is only one other defendant, there
is a strong inferential connection that the only other codefendant is
the "someone." '282 When there are twelve defendants, however,
"someone" is not nearly as incriminating."3 Another factor that
281. The Court has held that the use of nicknames or physical descriptions as a method
of redaction is impermissible, as these methods are obviously incriminating in the same way
that blank spaces are obviously incriminating. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195
(1998) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253 (1969) (finding a Bruton violation
where a defendant's confession, which gave a description of his codefendant's age, height,
weight, and hair color, was redacted to replace his codefendant's name with "white guy')).
The Seventh Circuit discussed the use of descriptive words as a redaction method in United
States v. Hoover, 246 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2001). In Hoover, the government introduced
one defendant's redacted confession, having replaced the name of defendant Hoover, who was
in jail at the time, with "incarcerated leader," and the name of the other defendant, Shell,
who was free at the time, with "unincarcerated leader." Id. The court rejected the
government's argument that the confession was not incriminating unless read in conjunction
with evidence that Hoover was in jail and Shell was not. Id. The court found the redaction
method to be an obvious indication of which defendants' names were redacted, and thus no
different than the symbols used in Gray. Id. Indeed, according to the court, "[o]nly a person
unfit to be a juror could have failed to appreciate that the 'incarcerated leader' and
'unincarcerated leader' were Hoover and Shell," and the redaction method used "no more
concealed [the defendants'] identities than the substitution of 'Mark Twain' for 'Samuel
Clemens' conceals the author." Id. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit rejected the "four-
corners" test, holding instead that a court must consider the evidence linking the confession
to the defendants in order to see if their Sixth Amendment rights would be violated by the
admission of the confession.
282. As the Hoover court explained, any redaction method must "at least avoido a one-to-
one correspondence between the confession and easily identified figures sitting at the defense
table." Hoover, 246 F.3d at 1059; see also United States v. Sutton, 337 F.3d 792, 799-801 (7th
Cir. 2003) (discussing the "one-to-one correspondence" and the strength of the inferential
connection between a redacted confession and the identity of a particular defendant).
283. The Supreme Court recognized that numbers are important in its opinion in Gray,
noting that "the reference might not be transparent in other cases in which a confession, like
the present confession, uses two (or more) blanks, even though only one other defendant
appears at trial." 523 U.S. at 194-95. Post-Gray decisions in the lower courts have
underscored this concern about the number of defendants. In United States v. Vega Molina,
for example, the First Circuit discussed the possibility that a redaction method, in light of
the number of defendants, might "convey a compelling inference" as to the identity of the
redacted name. 407 F.3d 511, 520-21 (1st Cir. 2005). According to the First Circuit:
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must also be considered is the amount of evidence pointing to the
codefendant as the one whose name was redacted. Where there is
little evidence connecting the codefendant to the crime or the
statement, it is unlikely that a jury will be compelled to infer the
identity of the codefendant.
A redacted confession that creates a weak inferential connection
between the redacted statements and the defendant's identity
would fail to satisfy the requirements of this prong and would
therefore be admissible at trial as redacted. Because there is a weak
inferential connection between the redacted passage and the
identity of the codefendant, it is therefore reasonable to presume
that juries will follow limiting instructions with regard to the uses
of this evidence. 2"
3. Administering the Test
In order for this two-pronged test to be effective, it must be
administered by the trial judge prior to trial. This idea is consistent
with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require the
judge to consider "in camera any statements or confessions made by
the defendants which the government intends to introduce in
evidence at trial" to determine whether the joinder of a trial would
A particular case may involve numerous events and actors, such that no direct
inference plausibly can be made that a neutral phrase like "another person"
refers to a specific codefendant. A different case may involve so few defendants
that the statement leaves little doubt in the listener's mind about the identity
of "another person." In short, each case must be subjected to individualized
scrutiny.
Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 973-74 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that use of the phrase "Latin Kings" referred to a group of people, thus lacking
a "one-to-one correspondence" between the redaction method and the defendant, and was
therefore not inculpatory with respect to a specific defendant, regardless of the number of
defendants joined in the trial).
284. The question of symbol redaction presents a difficulty under this prong. There are
certainly situations in which the substitution of 'X' or "deleted" will be sufficient to protect
the defendant under this test, as it may require a fair amount of logic to make the inferential
connection between the symbol and the identity of the defendant. The Supreme Court
recognized this in Gray, noting that "in some instances the person to whom the blank refers
will not be clear." See Gray, 523 U.S. at 194. This Note's two-pronged test is not undermined
by deferring to the precedential value of Gray, which declared that all symbol redaction is
per se unconstitutional. See id. at 195.
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in any way prejudice a defendant." In determining whether the
admission of a redacted confession would be prejudicial under the
previously discussed two-pronged test, the judge may request that
the prosecutor provide a summary of the evidence and witnesses
the state intends to introduce at trial. Again, such an approach is
not inconsistent with other practices according to which a judge
may require in camera inspection of evidence prior to determining
its admissibility. 8 If the judge concludes that the confession as
redacted is not "powerfully incriminating," either because it fails to
invite speculation or because there is a tenuous inferential connec-
tion between the redactions and the codefendants, the court may
properly admit the confession provided the court issues an appro-
priate limiting instruction to the jury. A judge's decision to admit
a redacted confession would be reviewed under an. abuse of
discretion standard, which would require the appellate court to
examine the trial judge's decision as to what the reasonable juror
would believe regarding the confession." 7 By requiring pretrial
examination of whether a confession is "powerfully incriminating"
to the point of being prejudicial, prosecutors would avoid the
difficulties of having to put on their entire case before learning
whether a confession is admissible.2"
285. See FED. R. CRIM. P.14 (concerning the joinder and severance of trials).
286. Such might be the case when a judge must weigh the probative value of evidence
against its prejudicial effect before submitting it to the jury, as required under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring a balancing test to determine whether
evidence is unduly prejudicial).
287. In the exceptional circumstance where a properly admitted redacted confession is
read into the record by a witness who accidentally mentions the name of the codefendant
instead of the redaction, an appellate court would have to consider whether the mistake, in
light of the presumption that a limiting instruction is sufficient to protect a defendant where
a redacted confession was properly admitted, amounted to harmless error.
288. The common practice in many courts has been to require the prosecutor to put on his
entire case before the judge would rule on the admissibility of the confession (and thus
whether joinder is appropriate). Justice Scalia advocates this practice as opposed to the
pretrial examination, for, as he suggested in Richardson, the pretrial examination would be
"time consuming and obviously far from foolproof." Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209
(1987). Surely such a prophylactic measure is not more time consuming and burdensome
than forcing the prosecutor to put on his entire case only to find that the trial must be
severed because the confession was too prejudicial to be admissible. Similarly, the suggestion
that the fear of taking too much time should take precedence over providing the defendant
the greatest protection of his constitutional rights is not persuasive. As the dissent in
Richardson explained, "[o]n the scales of justice, ... considerations of fairness ... outweigh
administrative concerns." Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
Various justifications have been offered to explain the recent
prevalence of joint criminal trials. These factors include the tactical
advantages to the prosecution of having all defendants in the
courtroom at the same time, the benefits of not having to introduce
the same evidence or call the same witnesses multiple times, the
relaxed evidentiary rules in conspiracy trials, the desire to preserve
the efficiency of the courts, and America's increased focus on
prosecuting group crime.289 Although these reasons for joinder may
be compelling in some circumstances, the fact remains that joint
trials can often work to the detriment of the rights of a defendant.
The danger that a defendant's rights may be trampled on in such a
trial is vividly illustrated by the Bruton problem. Jurors are human
beings, and it is sometimes impossible for them to suppress their
natural inclination to try to discover the identity of the redaction in
a defendant's confession and to not use the confession as evidence
against his codefendant. In attempting to protect the rights of
defendants to cross-examine the witnesses against them, however,
the Supreme Court has only muddied the waters as to how a
confession of a codefendant may be introduced into evidence
consistent with that right.29 It is of no comfort to say that simply
severing the trials or refusing to use the confession is the solution
to this problem, as these options may not be practical or may be
overly burdensome to prosecutors or defendants in some circum-
stances. It is necessary, therefore, for the Court to finally and
authoritatively settle the remaining issues that arise when the
confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced into
evidence in a joint trial.
289. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 67-69 (discussing the reasons for the prevalence of
multiple-defendant criminal trials and noting that prosecutions of group criminal activity
have increased).
290. Some states have attempted to clarify the issue of codefendant confessions on their
own through legislation. See, e.g., VT. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(2)(C) (requiring the trial court, when
ruling on a motion for severance based on the offer of a confession into evidence, to give the
prosecuting attorney who intends to offer the confession the choice of either severing the
trials, not using the confession, or using the confession, provided "all references to the
moving defendant have been deleted" and "provided that the court finds that the statement,
with the references deleted, will not prejudice the moving defendant).
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On the question of neutral pronoun redaction, a method on which
the Court has not directly spoken, this Note has concluded that
allowing the admission of confessions redacted using neutral
pronouns would be consistent with the Bruton-Richardson-Gray
line of cases in light of the differences between neutral pronouns
and symbols, as well as the tenuous inferential connection sug-
gested by neutral pronoun redaction. This Note has also offered a
two-pronged test that accounts for the Court's precedent in this
area and will make the evaluation of which confessions are
"powerfully incriminating" easier. Under this test, which requires
both a facial evaluation and a contextual evaluation of the confes-
sion, one method of redaction the Court has not addressed, neutral
pronoun redaction, would be found generally permissible given the
attenuated nature of the inference required to connect a neutral
pronoun to the name it has replaced.29' Furthermore, this test
balances the interest in efficient and effective prosecution with the
need to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights in a way that
the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence on the issue does not.
Without question, one of the most cherished rights in America is
the right to a fair trial. Until the Supreme Court decides whether
neutral pronouns are "powerfully incriminating" and sets out a
clear approach for determining when a redacted confession is
admissible, no defendant who finds himself in a Bruton conundrum
will be able to fully enjoy that right.
Bryan M Shay*
291. This test must be administered on a case-by-case basis, considering the factors
outlined in Part IV.D.2. As such, there are some circumstances under the recommended test
in which neutral pronoun redaction may not be sufficient to protect the defendant. Generally,
however, because of the weak inferential connection between neutral pronouns and a
particular defendant's identity, such redaction would be sufficient. As previously discussed,
under the Court's present standards, neutral pronoun redaction would be found permissible
given the differences between it and the symbol method found unconstitutional in Gray.
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